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Lessons from Tianjin

Resilience Strategy & Program Maturity

Tianjin explosionPerhaps no industrial accident in recent memory has had such an impact on public awareness of chemical safety as the explosions at the Port of Tianjin that killed more than 170 people last year. The largest of the blasts was the equivalent of more than 21 tons of TNT and involved sodium cyanide, toluene diisocyanate, and calcium carbide. Within hours, dramatic Internet video of the catastrophe circulated around the world. In the minds of many observers, in addition to raising concern for those in harm’s way, the explosion also created questions about chemical safety in the region.

The warehouse where the blasts originated was owned by Ruihai Logistics, a company specializing in shipping and handling hazardous chemicals. The inciting event that touched off the blast is still not known, and may never be.

However, it’s clear that several problematic factors made the challenge of controlling the blasts and their aftermath more difficult. When first responders arrived at the site, it’s believed they attempted to put out the raging fires with water – unwittingly causing a dangerous reaction because some of the onsite chemicals reacted adversely to water. It’s also clear that many of the chemicals were being stored in the facility illegally. Because of this, first responders may have been misinformed about what substances awaited them and/or what quantities were present. The lasting environmental impacts of the blasts are also currently unknown and remain a matter of grave concern to many.

Whatever the original cause of the blast was, China is now paying the price for this disaster in many ways. In addition to the arrest of more than 10 officials at the Port of Tianjin, China has been forced to devote considerable time and expense to publishing new clarifications of its chemical hazard regulations. The Chinese government has also floated a plan to relocate more than 1,000 facilities that treat, manufacture, or use hazardous chemicals away from population centers – a move which will run into the tens of billions of dollars. Perhaps most damaging, yet at the same time hardest to quantify, is the reputation cost to the Chinese chemical industry.

Faced with such a stark reminder of the consequences of chemical disasters, we are moved to ask questions. Namely, could this blast have been prevented, what could have been done to mitigate its damage more effectively, and could it happen here?

Haling-QuoteA Lack of Regulatory Power and Transparency

There’s a traditional Chinese saying, sometimes translated as: “The emperor is very powerful, but he is very far away.” For some global observers, this handily captures the dangers in the prevailing attitude in China toward chemical safety enforcement. The government is empowered to act, but only rarely does so. There seems to be a general acknowledgement that while many regulations exist, they will likely never be enforced.

China is known for tough – some say severe – punishments for criminal offenders via its legal system, but China’s enforcement of worker safety laws is not as similarly stringent. The entities that regulate chemical safety in China do not have the resources to ensure compliance across the entire country. Rather, local governments are frequently charged with seeing that national safety rules are followed.

Though the United States is different from China in important ways, the United States shares some of the same challenges and tensions related to enforcement. For example, many observers characterize OSHA as underfunded and hampered by resource constraints. Given its budget and manpower, it’s been reported that OSHA only has the capacity to inspect about 40,000 workplaces per year – out of a total of more than 8 million. Others point out that the fines and penalties available to OSHA may be far less than what is needed to deter violators. However, relative to China, the United States has been able to successfully deploy safety enforcement agencies to every part of the country, and has achieved an openness and transparency regarding safety enforcement, accidents, and both its successes and areas in need of improvement.

When we ask “Could Tianjin have happened here?” we must consider governmental, regulatory, and other factors that are unique to China.

China is the most populous country on Earth and has the second-largest economy. It has seen the recent development of a newly-affluent class of consumers, and it is projected to become the top global market for luxury goods by the end of this decade. At the same time, China is still in many senses a developing nation, racing to catch up with other global leaders.

For instance, despite being roughly the same size as the United States, it has only one-sixth of the available farmland. Feeding its population and meeting economic growth objectives can create significant safety and environmental costs, but China’s single-party state government is often loath to release information on these costs. For example, in 2013 the government decreed that soil pollution levels in China were a “state secret” when a Beijing lawyer attempted to access results of an environmental survey. Workplace safety data from China is likewise often unavailable or unreliable, but a study from the 1990’s found that 83 percent of rural industrial workers had at least one occupational hazard in their workplaces, and that 34 percent of all blue-collar workers worked around hazards.
Not all of these reported workplace hazards contain the potential for a large or catastrophic incident like Tianjin, but some definitely do. The Tianjin disaster is the second major explosion in China in as many years with hundreds left dead or injured. In the 2014 Kunshan explosion, more than 250 workers were killed or injured when an automotive parts factory in Eastern China exploded. Clearly, these are not isolated incidents or anomalies, but symptoms of a larger struggle to find balance between production and safety. Again, here we will see that – although conditions are somewhat different – these tensions are also reflected in the United States.

Tianjin mapGradual Movement Toward Regulation

Over the years, there has been a steady drive toward more effective regulation and accountability in both China and the United States. In both nations, tensions run high in the battle over how much regulation is too much. Some U.S. companies claim that because of OSHA, the EPA and other agencies, they can’t compete with countries like China where regulation is more lax. At the other end of the spectrum, disasters like Tianjin can shake the confidence of risk-averse businesses and investors, making it difficult for companies to access the capital necessary to operate well in today’s competitive marketplace.

In 1971, China carried out its first foray into regulating hazardous chemicals by conducting a national census of toxic substances, including lead, mercury, and others. In the 21st century, China has passed several measures intended to boost the safety of both workers and local communities. These include the Occupational Disease Control Act of PRC and the Work Safety Act of PRC (both passed in 2002). These measures offered new protections for workers and created safety requirements for businesses, but chemical safety was not emphasized to the same degree as other safety hazards (such as silica-dust exposure, which has been estimated to contribute to more than 75 percent of the work-related illnesses in China).

Tianjin and its aftermath may indeed lead to a new focus on chemical safety for China, but we will have to watch and see if any new regulations are given teeth. In the United States, regulators tend to respond to large chemical accidents with increased enforcement. This was seen most recently after the West, Texas, fertilizer explosion.

In April of 2013, a facility run by the West Fertilizer Company in West, Texas, suffered an ammonium nitrate explosion that killed 15 people, injured 160, and damaged or destroyed 150 buildings and homes. While the facility had faced OSHA citations for improper hazardous chemical storage as far back as 1985, no substantive safety improvements had been made. After the explosion, it was revealed that the company had not properly disclosed its full stock of ammonium nitrate to the Department of Homeland Security, as required by federal law.

Largely in response to this incident, later that year the White House issued Executive Order 13650 (EO) – Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security. The EO established a working group lead by the EPA, the Department of Labor and the Department of Homeland Security, and is comprised of a dozen other federal agencies. The purpose of the working group is to strengthen community communication and preparedness around chemical hazards and enhance the ability of government entities to identify and address chemical threats to diminish likelihood of an event. Key measures proposed by the working group (some of which are already underway) include: cross-training inspectors to look for multi-agency violations; compiling and sharing chemical facility reporting data across agencies to identify business out of compliance (e.g. a company reporting to the EPA, but not OSHA); and improving the communication between stakeholders in the lifecycle of hazardous chemicals (e.g. agencies, first responders, and facilities with chemicals).

Regarding the urgency to create better communication among stakeholders, the working group specifically calls out the role new technology should play in fostering this interchange. I believe strongly that private industry has an opportunity to lead the way in bridging the communication gap between chemical facilities and emergency personnel.

In 1984, the worst industrial accident in human history occurred when the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, leaked methyl isocyanate into the air as the surrounding community slept. About 2,500 people were killed instantly, and about half a million suffered some form of chemical injury. Based on concern that such accidents could happen in the United States, the U.S. Congress worked to pass the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, or EPCRA. This act created emergency plans to help protect the public from chemical accidents and mandated that employers using or storing large amounts of hazardous chemical make that information public. Employers were also required to create disaster plans for their facilities.

Lessons for Us All

After the explosions in Tianjin, OSHA head Dr. David Michaels traveled to China to participate in a roundtable about the collaborative roles of governments, businesses, and workers in better understanding and preventing industrial accidents. In a statement about the trip, Dr. Michaels emphasized that we are living in an increasingly interconnected world, and commitment to worker safety must be made a priority as goods and relationships span across continents.

As the world gets smaller and smaller, there are signs that governments are recognizing the need to align chemical safety accordingly. For example, though they are currently using different versions, both China and the United States have now aligned their hazardous chemical safety standards to the Globally Harmonized System (GHS) developed by the United Nations. The GHS aims to provide greater cohesiveness between nations for the communications of hazards, the labeling of chemicals, and ensuring the safety of workers. It is a voluntary program, but results in greater alignment of chemical safety labeling than has ever been previously achieved.

When we look to the future, it’s clear that working to prevent hazardous chemical accidents will be a vital task for all nations that wish to play a leading role in global commerce. Never before has technology made it easier for word of a chemical accident (to say nothing of video footage) to spread across the Web and international media. Yet at the same time, we have never had more tools to allow us to prevent and control chemical hazards and to access information that will allow us to respond safely and effectively when an incident does occur.

By following the safety rules enacted in the United States, American businesses can help ensure they keep their facilities and workers safe, and they avoid the kind of catastrophic accidents seen in Tianjin.

Haling-ChuckChuck Haling is vice president of sales at VelocityEHS. In 2015, MSDSonline and its wholly-owned subsidiary KMI formed VelocityEHS to reflect the company’s focus on a faster and simpler approach to EHS, sustainability, and risk management. Additional information MSDSonline, the VelocityEHS chemical management solution can be found at www.MSDSonline.com. For more information about the VelocityEHS platform, visit www.VelocityEHS.com or call (888) 362-2007.

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